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Abstract
We consider an overlapping generations model with environment, where
we introduce an elastic labor supply. In this framework, consumers have
to choose between consumption, environmental quality and leisure. We es-
tablish that several steady states can coexist, even under a Cobb-Douglas
technology, and we put in evidence a non monotonic relationship between
pollution and per capita income, as suggested by the Environmental Kuznets
Curve. Moreover studying local dynamics, we show the existence of deter-
ministic cycles and endogenous ￿uctuations due to self-ful￿lling expectations.
In contrast to previous results, the occurrence of such ￿uctuations does not
require a high emission rate of pollution. Finally, we discuss some welfare
and policy implications of our results. Especially, we show that a govern-
ment which would reduce pollution emissions can face a trade-o￿ between an
increase of steady state welfare and an intergenerational welfare inequality
due to indeterminacy.
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RØsumØ
Nous considØrons un modŁle ￿ gØnØrations imbriquØes avec environnement,
dans lequel nous introduisons une o￿re de travail Ølastique. Dans cette
Øconomie, les consommateurs ont ￿ choisir entre consommation, qualitØ de
l’environnement et loisir. Nous Øtablissons que plusieurs Øtats stationnaires
peuvent coexister, mŒme lorsque la technologie est Cobb-Douglas, et nous
mettons en Øvidence une relation non monotone entre la pollution et le
revenu par tŒte, comme celle suggØrØe par la Courbe Environnementale ￿ la
Kuznets. De plus, Øtudiant la dynamique locale, nous montrons l’existence de
cycles dØterministes et de ￿uctuations endogŁnes dues aux anticipations auto-
rØalisatrices des agents. Contrairement ￿ de prØcØdents rØsultats, l’apparition
de telles ￿uctuations ne requiert pas un taux d’Ømission de pollution ØlevØ.
Finalement, nous discutons de certaines implications en termes de bien-Œtre et
de politique. Nous montrons en particulier qu’un gouvernement qui voudrait
rØduire les Ømissions de pollution peut Œtre confrontØ ￿ un arbitrage entre
augmenter le bien-Œtre ￿ l’Øtat stationnaire et crØer une inØgalitØ intergØnØra-
tionnelle due ￿ l’indØtermination de l’Øquilibre.
21 Introduction
The link between environment and dynamic economics has been studied in a
lot of contributions.1 In this literature, overlapping generations models have
been used in order to clearly analyze intergenerational problems (John and
Pecchenino (1994), John, Pecchenino, Schimmelpfennig, and Schreft (1995),
Pezzey and Toman (2002)). However, most of these papers deal with the
question of sustainability. It is why they are only interested in steady states
analysis and monotonic convergence.
Recently, some papers have enlighten that more complex dynamics can
emerge when one considers the interaction between environment and eco-
nomic activity. Indeed, considering overlapping generations models where
consumers have to choose between consumption and abatement, Seegmuller
and VerchŁre (2004) and Zhang (1999) have shown the existence of deter-
ministic cycles and chaos.
Nevertheless, in these works, labor is constant because its supply is in-
elastic. However, it is well-known that labor plays an important role on
economic dynamics, both on growth and ￿uctuations. In particular, the
choice between leisure and consumption has been exploited in the analysis of
endogenous ￿uctuations. For example, in overlapping generations economies,
the occurrence of endogenous ￿uctuations requires a negatively slopped la-
bor supply in monetary models (Grandmont (1985), Grandmont (1989)),
whereas it is based on a su￿ciently elastic labor supply when there is capital
accumulation (Cazzavillan (2001), Reichlin (1986)).
In this paper, we relate these two types of contributions analyzing the
emergence of endogenous ￿uctuations, the ￿rst one which studies the link be-
tween economic dynamics and environment and the second one which notably
exploits the labor supply elasticity. Considering an overlapping generations
economy, we assume that consumers have to choose between consumption,
environmental quality and leisure, and share their labor income between sav-
ings and abatement, because pollution negatively a￿ects their preferences.
This framework allows us to show the coexistence of several steady states,
the appearance of a stationary Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), the
emergence of endogenous ￿uctuations, and ￿nally some welfare and policy
implications.
In other words, considering a utility function characterized by a con-
stant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES), we study uniqueness or
multiplicity of steady states and we establish that a multiplicity of steady
states can be easily obtained. In contrast to the recent analysis developed
1For a recent survey see Xepapadeas (2003).
3by Cazzavillan (2001), such multiplicity appears even if the technology is
Cobb-Douglas.
Concerning also the steady state analysis, we show that the pollution-
income relationship (PIR) can have a non monotonic shape, namely an EKC.
Hence, pollution ￿ow raises for a su￿ciently low level of per capita income,
before to exhibit a U-turn for greater ones, as it is empirically documented,
at least for some pollutants, by Grossman and Krueger (1993), Selden and
Song (1994), Sha￿k (1994) and Carson, Jeon, and McCubbin (1997).
Studying local dynamics, we prove that local indeterminacy and deter-
ministic cycles can occur. It means that not only cyclical deterministic tra-
jectories can appear, but also endogenous ￿uctuations due to self-ful￿lling
expectations, under weaker conditions than previous existing works. Indeed,
contrary to several contributions, we remark that the existence of indetermi-
nacy and cycles needs neither a weak substitution between production fac-
tors (Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder (1998), Reichlin (1986), Woodford
(1986)), nor increasing returns or imperfect competition (d’Aspremont, Dos
Santos Ferreira, and GØrard-Varet (1995), Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Caz-
zavillan (2001), Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga, and Pintus (1998)), Gali (1994)).
We can further notice that, in contrast to Seegmuller and VerchŁre (2004)
and Zhang (1999), the occurrence of such ￿uctuations does not require a
high level of the pollution emission rate. Consequently, this paper shows
more generally that non monotonic dynamics can easily occur in economies
where an environmental dimension is taken into account.
Finally, taken into account the previous results, we deduce some welfare
and policy implications. Considering a government that would like to reduce
the pollution emission rate per unit of capita, it could face to a trade-o￿
concerning the e￿ect of such a reduction on intergenerational welfare. On one
hand, welfare goes up with a lower pollution ￿ow while, on the other hand,
it can induce an intergenerational welfare inequality due to the occurrence of
￿uctuations driven by sunspots, as it is shown by Seegmuller and VerchŁre
(2004) in an one-dimensional model.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model. In section 3, we ￿rst establish the existence of a steady state, ana-
lyze uniqueness or multiplicity of steady states and then exhibit that every
stationary solution is characterized by an EKC. In section 4, we study local
dynamics and provide interpretations of our ￿ndings. In section 5, we give
some welfare and policy implications of our results. Finally, we present con-
cluding remarks in section 6, whereas several technical results are given in
the Appendix.
42 The Model
We consider a perfectly competitive overlapping generations model with dis-
cret time t = 1,2,...,∞ and a constant population normalized to one. A
generation of consumers is born at each period and households live two pe-
riods. So at each period, a generation of young and a generation of old
consumers coexist. When young, the representative consumer supplies labor
lt, which is remunerated at the real wage wt. He shares his wage earnings
between savings, through the purchase of aggregate capital kt, and environ-
mental maintenance dt.2 When old, he rents capital to the ￿rms, earns the
real interest factor rt+1 and consume the ￿nal good ct+1.3 Moreover, there is
a government that levies a constant tax τ ∈ (0,1) on his capital income to
￿nance its public expenditures Gt. The two budget constraints facing by the
consumer can be written:
kt + dt = wtlt (1)
ct+1 = (1 − τ)rt+1kt (2)
In this economy, the environmental quality decreases with respect to the
pollution. At period t + 1, the level of pollution is given by:
Pt+1 = αkt−1 − dt ≡ P(kt−1,dt) , with α > 0 (3)
The pollution, which is always strictly positive, linearly increases with
respect to the capital stock inherited from the previous period and is a de-
creasing function of the environmental maintenance. 4 In this sense, pollution
is a consequence of both the secularly accumulation of capital and agents’
actions against the negative e￿ects associated to this accumulation. Roughly
speaking, the externalities (αkt−1) can be seen as ￿ows from previous activ-
ities as well as wastes inherited from the past.
Consumers derive utility from consumption, leisure and environmental
quality. Assuming additively separable preferences, the utility function of
the representative household is given by:
2As in John and Pecchenino (1994), we consider positive environmental maintenance
or pollution abatement (dt ≥ 0).
3We assume that capital totally depreciates after one period of use.
4Note that the pollution Pt+1 can be interpreted as a ￿ow, or a stock determined by
Pt+1 = (1 − m)Pt + αkt−1 − dt, with a natural rate of absorption m equal to 1. Since, in
overlapping generations models, the length of period is assumed to be long, the assumption
m = 1 does not seem to be too restrictive.
5BU(ct+1/B) − vlt − P(kt−1,dt)
1+φ/(1 + φ) (4)
where B > 0 and v > 0 are two scaling parameters, and φ > 0. We can notice
that as usually in dynamic macroeconomic models, the disutility of labor is
linear (see Hansen (1985)), while the disutility of pollution is increasing and
convex. Furthermore, we assume:
Assumption 1 The function U(x) is continuous for all x ≥ 0, Cn for x > 0
and n large enough, with U0(x) > 0, U00(x) ≤ 0 and U0(x) + xU00(x) > 0.
The representative consumer maximizes his utility function (4) under the
constraints (1), (2) and (3). We deduce the two following equations:
U
0(ct+1/B)(1 − τ)rt+1wt = v (5)
(αkt−1 − dt)
φwt = v (6)
These two expressions de￿ne the consumer choice between leisure, envi-
ronmental maintenance and future consumption.
The ￿nal good is supplied by a representative ￿rm using a constant re-
turns to scale technology. The production is given by yt = f(at)lt, where
at = kt−1/lt denotes the capital-labor ratio and f(at) the intensive produc-
tion function. In what follows, we assume:
Assumption 2 The intensive production function f(a) is continuous for
a ≥ 0, positively valued and di￿erentiable as many times as needed for a > 0,
with f0(a) > 0 and f00(a) < 0.
The producers maximize their pro￿ts. Since the economy is perfectly
competitive, we obtain:
rt = f
0(at) ≡ r(at) (7)
wt = f(at) − atf
0(at) ≡ w(at) (8)
Finally, the government uses capital income taxation τrtkt−1 to ￿nance
public expenditures Gt. At each period, the budget is balanced, i.e. Gt =
τrtkt−1. One can further notice that the public good does neither enter the
utility function, nor a￿ect the technology, but a amount of Gt can eventually
be used to reduce the pollution emission rate α.5
5See section 5 below.
6Substituting equations (1), (2), (7) and (8) into (5) and (6), we can de￿ne
an intertemporal equilibrium as follows. An intertemporal equilibrium is a
sequence (at,kt−1)t≥1 which satis￿es:
U










αkt−1 > w(at)kt−1/at − kt ≥ 0 (11)
where k0 > 0 is given.
Note that inequalities (11) ensure a strictly positive pollution and a posi-
tive environmental maintenance. Taken as given these conditions, equations
(9) and (10) de￿ne a two-dimensional dynamic system with one predeter-
mined variable, the capital. One can further notice that the environmental
dimension of the model implicitly appears into (9), by kt, which is given by
relation (10). Indeed, this last equation means in fact that kt = w(at)lt − dt
at equilibrium, where dt = αkt−1 − Pt+1 and Pt+1 = (v/w(at))1/φ. Note that
in the limit case without any pollution (α = 0), the trade-o￿ between in-
vestments in productive capital and environmental maintenance disappears
(dt = 0), and equation (10) becomes kt = w(at)lt.
Before studying steady states, we de￿ne the following relationships. We
note s(a) ≡ r(a)a/f(a) ∈ (0,1) the capital share in income and further-
more, if σ(a) represents the elasticity of capital-labor substitution, 1/σ(a) =
dlnw(a)/dlna − dlnr(a)/dlna. Since w0(a) = −ar0(a), we obtain the two
following expressions:
w
0(a)a/w(a) = s(a)/σ(a) and r
0(a)a/r(a) = −(1 − s(a))/σ(a) (12)
3 Steady State Analysis
In this section, we ￿rst establish the existence of a steady state. Secondly, we
analyze the uniqueness and multiplicity of stationary solutions considering an
economy where consumer utility is characterized by a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (CIES). Finally, using such consumer preferences,
we also study the link between the pollution and the level of production at
a steady state.
73.1 Existence of a Steady State
A stationary solution of the dynamic system de￿ned by (9), (10) and (11) is
given by (a,k) such that:
U
0((1 − τ)r(a)k/B)(1 − τ)r(a)w(a) = v (13)
k











α + 1 > w(a)/a > 1 (15)
We can notice that in section 4 we are interested in ￿uctuations around a
steady state. Since environmental maintenance has to be positive at each pe-
riod, we assume a strictly positive environmental maintenance at the steady
state, i.e. w(a)/a > 1.
Following Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga, and Pintus (1998) and Aloi, Dixon,
and Lloyd-Braga (2000), we ensure in what follows the existence of a nor-
malized steady state (a,k) = (1,1) by choosing appropriate values of the two
scaling parameters B > 0 and v > 0. In order to do that, we assume:
Assumption 3 α + 1 > w(1) > 1.
Under Assumptions 1-3, there exists a unique solution v∗ > 0 to the
equation:
v
∗ = (α + 1 − w(1))
φw(1) (16)
Assume that limx→+∞U0(x) < v∗/((1 − τ)r(1)w(1)) < limx→0U0(x).




∗/((1 − τ)r(1)w(1)) (17)
Proposition 1 Assuming that limx→+∞U0(x) < v∗/((1 − τ)r(1)w(1)) <
limx→0U0(x) and Assumptions 1-3 are satis￿ed, then (a,k) = (1,1) is a
steady state of the dynamic system (9)-(10) if and only if v∗ and B∗ are the
unique solutions of (16) and (17).
83.2 Uniqueness and Multiplicity of Steady States in a
CIES Economy
In Proposition 1, we have established the existence of a steady state (a,k) =
(1,1). However, this steady state is not necessarily unique. In this section,
assuming that Proposition 1 is satis￿ed and considering a constant intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (CIES) economy, we analyze the uniqueness
or multiplicity of stationary solutions. We notably prove that it can exist
two steady states even if the technology has an unit elasticity of capital-labor
substitution (Cobb-Douglas).
Since we consider a CIES economy, we assume:
Assumption 4 U(X) = X1−u/(1 − u), with u ∈ (0,1).
One can easily veri￿es that this utility function satis￿es Assumption 1.




















and which satis￿es the inequality (15). Equation (18) de￿nes a function










w(a)1/φ(α + 1 − w(a)/a)
(21)
Studying the uniqueness or multiplicity of steady states requires to ana-
lyze the number of stationary solutions a to the equation F(a) ≡ G(a)/H(a) =
1.
In what follows, we note a such that w(a)/a = 1 + α and a such that
w(a)/a = 1. Furthermore, we assume:
Assumption 5 s(1) < 1/2 and σ(a) > s(a) for all a ∈ (a0,a1), with a0 < a
and a1 > a.
The ￿rst assumption means that capital share in income is smaller than
one half at the steady state (a,k) = (1,1). The second one is not too re-
strictive and is empirically founded. Among others, Du￿y and Papageorgiou
9(2000) show that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor take
values in a neighborhood of the unit case, greater and smaller values than
one being admissible.6 It means that w(a)/a is a strictly decreasing function
for all a ∈ (a0,a1), where a0 can be arbitrarily close to a and a1 arbitrarily
close to a. Since w(a)/a belongs to (1,1+α), a belongs to (a,a). Moreover,
under Assumption 3, we have a < 1 < a, which also implies that σ(1) > s(1).
Now, we study the number of solutions of the equation F(a) = 1 when
a ∈ (a,a). Using equations (16), (17), (20) and (21), we have:
F(a) = I(a)
α + 1 − w(a)/a










We can easily verify that F(1) = 1. From the de￿nition of a, we deduce
that F(a) = 0. Moreover, we have:
F(a) = I(a)
α
α + 1 − w(1)
(23)
We can notice that F(a) decreases with respect to α. Furthermore, when
I(a) ≥ 1, F(a) > 1 for all α. On the contrary, when I(a) < 1, F(a) = 1 for






Hence, F(a) > 1 for α < α∗ and F(a) < 1 for α > α∗. In what follows,
we note σ = σ(1) and s = s(1). Then, di￿erentiating (22) evaluated at a = 1







s(1 + 1/φ) + (σ − s)
w(1)







We can easily establish that F 0(1)/F(1) < 0 if u/(1−u) < γuT, F 0(1)/F(1)
= 0 if u/(1 − u) = γuT and F 0(1)/F(1) > 0 if u/(1 − u) > γuT, where γuT is
given in the Appendix.
From these ￿ndings, we can deduce the main results concerning the num-
ber of steady states:
6As we will see, we will also need this assumption in sections 3.3 and 4.
10Proposition 2 Considering that Assumptions 2-5 are satis￿ed and that there
exists a steady state, namely (a,k) = (1,1) (Proposition 1), we have the fol-
lowing.
(i) If I(a) ≥ 1 or if I(a) < 1 and α < α∗, there exists an odd number of
steady states. Furthermore, if u/(1 − u) < γuT, there are at least three
stationary solutions.
(ii) If I(a) < 1 and α > α∗, there exists an even number of steady states.
This proposition establishes that several steady states can coexist. In par-
ticular, when u/(1 − u) crosses γuT (i.e. F 0(1)/F(1) crosses 0), two steady
states can exchange their stability properties or two new stationary solu-
tions can appear in the neighborhood of the steady state a = 1. These two
phenomenon can be related to the results that we will obtain in section 4
(Proposition 4) when we will study the emergence of endogenous ￿uctuations.
Indeed, the ￿rst one corresponds to the occurrence of a transcritical bifur-
cation, whereas the second one corresponds to the occurrence of a pitchfork
bifurcation.7
We can further notice that considering an overlapping generations model
with increasing returns, Cazzavillan (2001) has recently shown that the
steady state is always unique when the technology is Cobb-Douglas, whereas
there exist two steady states when one considers a small deviation of the
elasticity of capital-labor substitution from the unitary case. In contrast to
this result, we prove in the following corollary that in our framework, two
steady states can coexist even if the technology is Cobb-Douglas.
Corollary 1 Assume that f(a) = Aas with 1/(1−s) < A < (α+1)/(1−s)
and s < 1/2. Then, there exists two steady states when (1 − u)/u > (s/(1 −
2s))(1 + 1/φ) and α > α∗.
Proof. When the production is given by y = Af(a)l, with f(a) = as, then
w(a) = (1−s)Aas. Since 1/(1−s) < A < (α+1)/(1−s), we ￿rst notice that
Assumption 3 is veri￿ed. Hence, applying results obtained in Proposition 2,
one can establish that there are two steady states if (1 − u)/u > (s/(1 −
2s))(1 + 1/φ) and α > α∗. 
These results notably mean that under a Cobb-Douglas technology, the
existence of several steady states requires a high intertemporal elasticity of
7For more details about the link between the multiplicity of steady states and the
occurrence of a transcritical bifurcation, see Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga, and Pintus (1998).
11consumption (small u) and/or a strongly convex disutility of pollution (high
φ). It corresponds to the case where consumer utility is weakly a￿ected
by a variation of consumption whereas it is strongly sensitive to pollution
variations.
3.3 The Pollution-Income Relationship
The Pollution-Income Relationship (PIR) have received a lot of attention in
recent years. From an empirical point of view, several contributions have
shown that this relation can take an inverted-U shape, namely the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve (EKC). The EKC conjecture states that, in the long
run, economic growth allows to solve previous environmental matters. It
degrades the environment at low levels of income, but as income increases,
harmful environmental e￿ects go down. So, according to this hypothesis,
environment and natural resources are over-stressed and over-exploited at
the beginning of development to sustain the take-o￿ and accelerate economic
growth. When the level of development is high enough, the environment
becomes more valued by people, and through technical progress and the de-
mand for green goods and technologies, it becomes possible to create wealth
with reduced environmental degradation. For example, the seminal paper
by Grossman and Krueger (1993) found an EKC for sulphur dioxide ( SO2).
Selden and Song (1994) and Carson, Jeon, and McCubbin (1997) exhibit this
shape for SO2, suspended particulate matter (SPM) and oxides of nitrogen
(NOx), whereas Sha￿k (1994) shows it for SO2 and SPM.
Some economists have try to ￿nd some theoretical foundations of this re-
lationship (see among others John and Pecchenino (1994) and Stokey (1998)).
In this section, we prove that our framework is also characterized by such a
link between income and environmental quality. 8 In other words, we estab-
lish the conditions to obtain a relation close to the EKC between output and
environmental quality. Since environmental quality decreases with respect
to pollution ￿ow in this model, it means that we will show that at a steady
state, production y increases with respect to pollution P for su￿ciently weak
levels of output and decreases when y is high enough.9 In order to do that we
assume in this section that U(X) satis￿es Assumption 4 and the technology
is CES, i.e.
8We restrict our attention to steady state analysis, because in this paper, when we
will study dynamics, we are interested in the emergence of cycles around the stationary
equilibria and not on long-run growth.




σ + 1 − s)
σ
σ−1, with s ∈ (0,1),σ > 0,σ 6= 1,A > 0 (26)
It means that the real wage is de￿ned by:
w(a) = A(1 − s)(sa
σ−1
σ + 1 − s)
1
σ−1 (27)
and the capital share in income by:
s(a) =
s













One can notice that the ￿rst inequality ensures that 1 < w(1) < 1 + α
(Assumption 3) and the last one that the utility for consumption is not too
concave.
Assuming in the rest of this section that it exists a steady state (a,k),
















From (29), we deduce that P decreases with respect to a. We then estab-
lish our result by showing that y is a decreasing function of a for su￿ciently
weak values of the capital-labor ratio, whereas it is an increasing function for





















When σ > 1, s(a) increases with respect to a, from 0 to 1 when a raises
from 0 to +∞, and then, under Assumption 6, y,a is strictly negative when
a is su￿ciently weak, whereas it is strictly positive when a is high enough.













Finally, since any steady state value has to satisfy inequalities (15), we







1−u(1 + 2σ) + 1
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σ−1 and lim u
1−u→ 1
σK(a
∗) = +∞ (34)
Under Assumption 6, sA < 1 + α and (2s)
1
σ−1 < 1 which imply that
lim u
1−u→0K(a∗) < 1 + α. Hence, there exists some values u
1−u ∈ (0, 1
σ) such
that 1 < w(a∗)/a∗ < 1 + α is satis￿ed.
We can summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 5 and 6, there exists an EKC relation-
ship between y and P at a steady state for appropriate values of u/(1 − u).
4 Local Dynamics
In this section, we analyze the local indeterminacy and the occurrence of
endogenous cycles. Furthermore, interpreting our results, we put in evidence
that the consumer choice between leisure, environmental maintenance and
future consumption has a key role on the occurrence of endogenous ￿uctua-
tions.
In order to do that, we study local dynamics in the neighborhood of
the steady state (a,k) = (1,1). We ￿rst di￿erentiate the dynamic system
(9)-(10) around (a,k) = (1,1). We note εu ≡ −U00(c/B)(c/B)/U0(c/B) ∈
(0,1). Using (12) and after some computations, we obtain the trace T and
the determinant D of the associated Jacobian matrix, which respectively
represent the sum and the product of the two eigenvalues of the characteristic















+ w(1) − α
(35)
14D = (1 + γu)D1(α) , with D1(α) =
s
1 − s
(w(1) − α) (36)
with γu ≡ εu/(1−εu) ∈ (0,+∞), which represents an index of the concavity
of utility for consumption.
Following Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder (1998), we study the local
stability of the steady state and the occurrence of bifurcations by analyzing
the trace T and the determinant D in the plane (see ￿gure 1). On the
line (AC), one eigenvalue is equal to 1 (P(1) = 0). On the line (AB), one
eigenvalue is equal to −1 (P(−1) = 0). On the segment [BC], the two
eigenvalues are complex conjugates and have an unit modulus ( T 2−4D < 0,
D = 1). We deduce that if (T,D) is inside (ABC), the steady state is a
sink. When 1 − T + D > (<)0 and 1 + T + D < (>)0, the steady state is
a saddle. Otherwise, it is a source. Since one variable is predetermined, the
steady state is locally indeterminate if it is a sink and is locally determinate
if it is a saddle or a source.
Suppose now that T and D change when a parameter, called the bifur-
cation parameter, varies continuously. When (T,D) crosses the line (AC),
a transcritical or a pitchfork bifurcation generically occurs. 10 When (T,D)
crosses the line (AB), one gets a ￿ip bifurcation, i.e. a cycle of period 2
appears around the steady state. When (T,D) crosses the segment [BC],
one gets a Hopf bifurcation, i.e. an invariant closed curve appears around
the steady state.11 Moreover, sunspot equilibria can appear around a steady
state if it is locally indeterminate. They can also occur in the neighborhood
of a cycle of period two if it is locally stable and in a neighborhood of an
invariant closed curve if the Hopf bifurcation is supercritical. 12
We choose γu as the bifurcation parameter. Under Assumption 1, γu
belongs to (0,+∞). We remark that when this bifurcation parameter varies,
(T,D) describes a half-line ∆ which starts at (T1(α),D1(α)) when γu tends
to 0 and has a slope S(α) de￿ned by:
S(α) =
φs(w(1) − α)
φ(σw(1) − s(w(1) − 1)) + s(α − (w(1) − 1))
(37)
We can study the local stability of the steady state and the occurrence
of bifurcations by analyzing the locus (T1(α),D1(α)) and the slope S(α)
10When one eigenvalue crosses the value 1, a saddle, a transcritical or a pitchfork bi-
furcation generically occurs. However, since we have shown that there exists at least one
steady state (Proposition 1), a saddle bifurcation cannot occur.
11For further information about local bifurcation theory, one can refer to Grandmont
(1988) or Wiggins (1990).































































Figure 1: The Geometrical Method
of the half-line ∆. In particular, we will discuss our results in function
of α. Recall that w(1) > 1 because we always consider a strictly positive
maintenance at the steady state and α > w(1) − 1 because the pollution is
also strictly positive (Assumption 3). We deduce that α can take any value
between w(1) − 1 and +∞. Furthermore, we assume that Assumption 5 is
satis￿ed. From a theoretical point of view, we are not interested in the case
where σ < s because it is well-known that endogenous ￿uctuations can occur
under such an assumption in perfectly competitive overlapping generations
economies without environmental dimension (see Reichlin (1986)). However,
they cannot emerge when σ > s.13
13Using our framework, the overlapping generations economy without an environmental
dimension is obtained considering the limit case where α = 0 and w(a) = a. It means that
pollution and enviromental maintenance are both equal to 0 at a steady state. Further-
more, the dynamics of the economy without environment are de￿ned by:
U0((1 − τ)r(at+1)kt/B)(1 − τ)r(at+1)w(at) = v (38)
16We can ￿rst notice that when α varies, the locus (T1(α),D1(α)) describes
a half-line ∆1 which has a slope equal to s/(1−s) ∈ (0,1) (see ￿gures 2 and
3). When α tends to w(1) − 1, we have:
T1(w(1) − 1) = 1/(1 − s) , D1(w(1) − 1) = s/(1 − s)
and 1 − T1(w(1) − 1) + D1(w(1) − 1) = 0
(42)
It means that (T1(w(1) − 1),D1(w(1) − 1)) is on the line (AC) between
the horizontal axis and the point C. When α increases, T1(α) and D1(α)
decreases and tends to −∞ when α tends to +∞. In particular, D1(α) = 0
when α = w(1) ≡ α0 and (T1(α),D1(α)) crosses the line (AB) when α =
w(1) + 1 ≡ αF1.
Under Assumption ??, the slope S(α) decreases with respect to α. It
means that the half-line ∆ makes a clockwise rotation around ∆1. In partic-
ular, we have:
S(w(1) − 1) =s/[σw(1) − s(w(1) − 1)] ∈ (0,1) , S(α0) = 0
and S(+∞) = −φ < 0
(43)
When φ ≤ 1, S(α) is always greater than −1, whereas when φ > 1, S(α)
can be smaller than −1. In particular, S(α) = −1 if α = αF2, where:
αF2 =
φ(σw(1) + s) − s(w(1) − 1)
s(φ − 1)
> αF1 (44)
From these ￿ndings, we deduce that the line ∆ goes through the point A
for α = αI, with αF1 < αI(< αF2).14
kt = w(at)kt−1/at (39)
Then, for σ(a) > s(a), one can easily prove that there exists a unique steady state if
lima→+∞w(a)/a < 1 < lima→0w(a)/a. Concerning now local dynamics, equations (35)












We deduce that 1+T +D > 0 and 1−T +D = γu
s−σ
1−s < 0 if σ > s. It means that under
Assumption ??, the steady state is a saddle and endogenous ￿uctuations cannot occur in
the overlapping generations economy without environment. One can further notice that
the existence of a constant tax rate on capital income does not a￿ect local dynamics.




















































































Figure 2: 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
Hence, when α = w(1) − 1, (T1(α),D1(α)) is on the line (AC) between
the horizontal axis and the point C. Moreover, the half-line ∆ has a slope
belonging to (0,1) and is on the right side of (AC). Then, the steady state
is always a saddle. However, it is a limit case where the level of pollution is
equal to zero.
When w(1)−1 < α ≤ αF1, (T1(α),D1(α)) is inside (ABC) and the slope
of the half-line ∆ is smaller than 1 and greater than −1. The half-line ∆
only crosses the line (AB).
When αF1 < α < αI, (T1(α),D1(α)) is on the left side of (AB) and the
half-line ∆ crosses the lines (AB) and (AC) above A.
When φ ≤ 1 and α > αI or when φ > 1 and αI < α < αF2, (T1(α),D1(α))
is on the left side of (AB) and the half-line ∆ crosses the lines (AB) and
(AC) below A.
Finally, when φ > 1 and α > αF2, (T1(α),D1(α)) is on the left side of
(AB) and the slope of ∆ is smaller than −1. Then, the half-line ∆ only














































































Figure 3: φ > 1
From these geometrical ￿ndings, we can deduce the following proposition
(see also ￿gures 2 and 3):
Proposition 4 Assume that Assumptions 1-3 and 5 are satis￿ed and that
there exists a steady state (Proposition 1). Then, the following generically
holds.
(i) If w(1) − 1 < α ≤ αF1, the steady state is a sink when γu < γuT, a
transcritical or a pitchfork bifurcation generically occurs when γu = γuT
and the steady state is a saddle when γu > γuT.
(ii) If αF1 < α < αI, the steady state is a saddle when γu < γuF, a ￿ip
bifurcation generically occurs when γu = γuF, the steady state is a
sink when γuF < γu < γuT, a transcritical or a pitchfork bifurcation
generically occurs when γu = γuT and the steady state is a saddle when
γu > γuT.
19(iii) If φ ≤ 1 and α > αI or if φ > 1 and αI < α < αF2, the steady state
is a saddle when γu < γuT, a transcritical or a pitchfork bifurcation
generically occurs when γu = γuT, the steady state is a source when
γuT < γu < γuF, a ￿ip bifurcation generically occurs when γu = γuF
and the steady state is a saddle when γu > γuF.
(iv) If φ > 1 and α > αF2, the steady state is a saddle when γu < γuT, a
transcritical or a pitchfork bifurcation generically occurs when γu = γuT
and the steady state is a source when γu > γuT.
The values γuT and γuF are given in the Appendix.
This proposition establishes that endogenous ￿uctuations can emerge in
the economy through the occurrence of local indeterminacy and ￿ip bifur-
cations. In particular, indeterminacy and then sunspot equilibria appear as
soon as α is not too high and γu is weak enough. It means that in contrast to
previous results analyzing the existence of cycles in dynamic models taking
into account the link between economy and environment (see Seegmuller and
VerchŁre (2004), Zhang (1999)), the emission rate of pollution has not to be
too high. Furthermore, as in Cazzavillan (2001) and Reichlin (1986), the
utility function for consumption must not be strongly concave. 15
We can further notice that endogenous ￿uctuations can occur when capi-
tal and labor are not weak substitutes as it is often required (see among oth-
ers Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder (1998), Reichlin (1986) and Woodford
(1986)). Our results do not depend any more on the existence of increasing
returns or imperfect competition (d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and
GØrard-Varet (1995), Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Cazzavillan (2001), Caz-
zavillan, Lloyd-Braga, and Pintus (1998)), Gali (1994)).
We interpret the occurrence of endogenous ￿uctuations by explaining how
non monotonic and cyclical trajectories emerge due to consumers’ choices
between consumption, environmental quality and leisure. In this way, ￿rst
recall the following relations:
I.1. kt + dt = wtlt;




15One can also notice that the constant tax rate on capital income has no in￿uence on
local dynamics. See Guo and Harrison (2004) for a similar result in the optimal growth
model.
20Assume now that one deviates from the steady state by an increase of the
capital stock kt−1. Then, taken into account I.2., young consumers expect
that future pollution Pt+1 will increase and reduce the level of their utility.
Consequently, following such expectation, they increase their labor supply lt
(because from I.3. the real wage decreases), and they reallocate their savings
from capital accumulation kt to environmental maintenance dt (see I.1.).
Since capital stock decreases, the next generation of consumers will expect a
weaker pollution ￿ow Pt+2 and then, by the reverse mechanism than the one
described above, both lt+1 and dt+1 will go down and kt+1 will raise; and so
on successively along the ￿uctuations.
Finally, one can observe that the greater is α, the most volatile is dt, which
can be a source of instability of the steady state and promote the determinacy
of the equilibrium. Hence, it explains why endogenous ￿uctuations emerge
for a not too high level of α.
5 Welfare and Policy Implications
In this section, we use the preceding results to derive some implications
concerning the consumer welfare and a policy which would like to reduce
pollution emissions.
Indeed, the government can decide to spend a ￿xed amount of its budget
e G < Gt to ￿nance di￿erent kinds of environmental policies to reduce the level
of intergenerational externality through a decrease of the emission rate α. For
example, the government can sustain the adoption of environmental friendly
technologies characterized by lower levels of pollutant emissions (water and
liquid waste treatment, solid waste recycling, particule ￿lters, low-use energy
technologies, etc).
Now, we stress that the conclusions established in Proposition 4 have also
some welfare implications. In order to enlighten them, we can notice the two
following elements.
First, one can see that consumer utility evaluated at a steady state in-
creases when the pollution emission rate (α) decreases, for a not too concave
utility function of consumption.16
16For example, using the CIES speci￿cation of section 3.2 and equations (4), (18) and
(19), the welfare W of a young consumer evaluated at the steady state (a,k) = (1,1) is
equal to:
W =





− α − φw(1)

(45)
One can show that dW/dα < 0 if the following condition is satis￿ed:
21Secondly, we have established that the occurrence of ￿uctuations due to
self-ful￿lling expectations requires a not too high pollution emission rate ( α <
αI). Moreover, using (47), we can deduce that γuT increases with respect to
α. It means that ￿uctuations driven by agent beliefs occur more easily for
higher α as soon as α < αI, whereas they no more occur when α > αI. Since
along ￿uctuations, utility of successive generations have generically not the
same level, it puts in evidence the existence of an intergenerational welfare
inequality.17
Consequently, an environmental policy such as those described above
which would aim to reduce pollution ￿ows, through a decrease of α, has
to be taken carefully. Indeed, authorities would face to the following trade-
o￿. On one hand, a reduction of α increases welfare at the steady state but,
on the other hand, it can induce an intergenerational welfare inequality as
soon as α crosses and becomes smaller than αI. On the contrary, such a
trade-o￿ is no more relevant if α is already smaller than αI before the policy
is e￿ective, because a greater decrease of α implies that indeterminacy occurs
less easily.18
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered an overlapping generations model with an
environmental dimension, where labor is elastically supplied. In this frame-
work, consumers have then to choose not only between consumption and
environmental quality, but between consumption, environmental quality and
leisure.
We can summarize the main results as follows. We have ￿rst established
that it can exist a multiplicity of steady states, even in the case of a Cobb-
Douglas technology. Secondly, we have exhibited that stationary solutions are
characterized by an inverted-U relationship between pollution and per capita
income, namely EKC. Thirdly, we have shown that not only deterministic
cycles can emerge, but also endogenous ￿uctuations due to self-ful￿lling ex-
pectations, under weaker conditions than those obtained in previous works.
u
1 − u
< w(1) − 1 +
1
φ
(α + 1 − w(1)) (46)
In other words, at the steady state (a,k) = (1,1) and for α > w(1)−1, consumer welfare
increases as soon as the emission rate of pollution decreases, if u/(1 − u) < w(1) − 1.
17An example of such intergenerational inequality has clearly been established in a more
simple framework by Seegmuller and VerchŁre (2004).
18Indeed, when α is smaller than αI, indeterminacy occurs for γu < γuT and γuT varies
in the same sense than α.
22One implication of our results is that they allow us to enlighten a trade-o￿
concerning the e￿ect of a reduction of pollution ￿ow on consumer welfare.
Indeed, a government that would try to reduce the pollution emission rate by
unit of capital could face the following contradiction: on one hand, it could
push-up consumer welfare at steady state, but on the other hand, create an
intergenerational welfare inequality.
Finally, considering the results of section 3.3 and 4 which show ￿rst,
that there is an EKC relationship between per capita income and pollution
which can also be seen as a dynamic long-run relation, and secondly, that
endogenous ￿uctuations can occur around this trend, then one can make
the following conjecture. The dynamic relationship between per capita in-
come and pollution ￿ow could be quite di￿erent than the one suggested by
the EKC, i.e. with a not necessarily inverted-U-shaped curve but rather a
more complex pattern. Such intuitive remark is sustained by some empirical
studies which establish the existence of "extended-N" relationships (see for
example Sha￿k (1994) on river pollution, or Grossman (1995), Panayotou
(1997) and Barrett and Graddy (2000) on SO2).
Appendix
1. The value γuT
γuT is such that F 0(1)/F(1) = 0 or 1 − T + D = 0. Using equations (25)
or (35)-(36), one obtains:
γuT =
(1 − 2s)(α − w(1) + 1)
w(1)(σ − s) + s(1 + φ)/φ(α − w(1) + 1)
(47)
2. The value γuF
γuF is such that 1 + T + D = 0. Using equations (35) and (36), one
obtains:
γuF =
φ(α − w(1) − 1)
φ(σw(1) + s) − s(w(1) − 1) − sα(φ − 1)
(48)
2. The value σI
σI is such that S(α) = (1 + D1(α))/T1(α). Using (35), (36) and (37), σI
is the unique solution of the following equation:
23a1α
























[(σφ − s(1 + φ))w(1) + s(1 + φ)]
(50)
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